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## INFORMATION REPORT INFORMATION REPORT

## CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

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COUNTRY Poland

REPORT

SUBJECT Communist Party's Return to  
Pre-October 1956 Goals

DATE DISTR. 2 NOV 1961

NO. PAGES 1

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THIS IS UNEVALUATED INFORMATION. SOURCE GRADINGS ARE DEFINITIVE. APPRAISAL OF CONTENT IS TENTATIVE.

1. ✓ A copy of a report, [redacted]  
[redacted] dealing with the return of the Polish Party to its  
pre-October 1956 goals [redacted]

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## INFORMATION REPORT INFORMATION REPORT

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REPORT

COUNTRY : Poland  
SUBJECT : Communist Party's Return to Pre-October 1956 Goals  
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1. Many people in Western Europe believe that the 1956 post-October changes made by the Polish United Workers' Party (Polska Zjednoczona Partja Robotnicza)(PZPR) under the leadership of Wladyslaw Gomulka were a manifestation of a genuine effort to decrease Soviet influence and to establish closer Polish relations with Western capitalist nations so that Poland might follow the so-called "Polish road to socialism." [redacted] 50X1-HUM  
during the October 1956 political disturbances, a great number of people with other than Communist convictions were able to establish themselves temporarily in important positions at various levels of government as well as within the PZPR. Many loyal Poles, taking advantage of the temporary weakness of the government, removed officials holding important administrative positions.
2. [redacted] the following instances of such removals: 50X1-HUM  
In Bochnia, Krakow Province, the PZPR Secretary, who was chairman of the County People's Council, was forced to resign. A Polish woman who belonged to no political party was unanimously elected to fill the vacancy in the county council, but remained in this position only a few days before being forced out by the PZPR. In the Party organization in the Katowice Regional PZPR Committee (Komitet Wojewodzki)(KW) the secretary of propaganda affairs, Korczynski (fnu), was forced to resign because of pressure of students from Czestochowa. In the eighth city district of Zabrze, the second secretary of the Agitation and Propaganda Committee, named Kongul, was forced to submit his resignation because of the pressure of students from the Medical Academy. All those individuals admitted that the Party had made many mistakes before October 1956 when they gave up their jobs. When the secretary of the Economics Department of the PZPR County Committee, Ryszard Trzcionka, a prominent Stalinist, insisted upon the quelling of a student demonstration in 1956 by club-swinging militia, the citizens of Zabrze demanded his immediate removal. The same situation prevailed during the last months of 1956 in practically every city in Poland.
3. During 1958 and 1959, however, many tried and true PZPR activists returned to their old positions. [redacted] Anatol Matros, 50X1-HUM  
the second secretary of the Municipal Committee in Zabrze, who had served in that position from 1951 up to the time of his removal in 1956. Previously he was notorious for his callous attitude towards the rights of private citizens, and he had caused the arrest of countless persons for minor violations. He was also an enthusiastic collaborator with the hated Public Security Administration (Urząd Bezpieczeństwa Publicznego)(UBP). Upon his return to PZPR office, he was named first secretary of the District Committee in Katowice-South. Another discharged activist named Szydlak, who was removed from the headquarters administration of the Association of Polish Youth (Związek Młodzieży Polskiej)(ZMP), was recalled to become Propaganda secretary of the Katowice Regional Committee. Shortly after his return he was promoted to first secretary in the Poznan Regional Committee.
4. By 1961, four and one-half years after Gomulka became Party secretary and allegedly removed all former Stalinists from positions of influence in the PZPR, practically all those unpopular Communists had returned to not only comparable, but sometimes even more important, positions than they held before the October political upheaval. Today Korczynski is the director of the Katowice television network. The same Ryszard Trzcionka who lost his position in 1956 became an assistant to the first secretary of the Katowice Regional Committee, Edward Gierek, and was also made the PZPR organizational secretary in it. The former Regional Committee secretary in Katowice, Jozef Olszewski, is the director of the Economic Department in the Central Committee in Warsaw. Both Olszewski and Cebo (fnu), who was called the Beriya of Katowice, had reputations for having wielded excessive Party influence over the decisions of the Katowice Region courts between 1952 and 1956. When these same hated PZPR activists continued to hold influential positions in Poland, then, [redacted] there can be no doubt that the political situation in Poland has undergone no substantial change since 1956. Of the many Party activists who made every effort to lessen Soviet influence inside Poland, only one was able to retain his important position until very recently. This was Jerzy Morasski, who was

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a former secretary of the Central Committee and chief editor of the Party newspaper Trybuna Ludu.

5. The real goal and the basic aims of the Polish Communists have undergone no change, even though many of the methods of PZPR activity are different. Today's PZPR methods are less crude and are more up-to-date. [redacted] 50X1-HUM  
[redacted] therein lies the real danger in the growth of Communist influence 50X1-HUM  
and power in Poland. [redacted] the basic changes Gomulka 50X1-HUM  
introduced were not so much concerned with the elimination of the pre-1956 50X1-HUM  
glorification of the Soviet Union as with a revision of the methods to be  
used by the PZPR in praising the Soviets. [redacted] 50X1-HUM  
[redacted]  
[redacted] Gomulka seemed convinced that the old methods were not  
only crude but also unpopular among all classes of Poles and could not  
evoke any kind of positive response from Polish society. That is why the  
Party changed its entire approach in the years after 1956.
6. One example of change in the Party is the relaxing of travel restrictions  
to the Soviet Union. When Bierut was president, it was very difficult  
for any Pole to travel to the Soviet Union, with the exception of certain  
Party delegations and the Security Police officials sent to the USSR for  
special training. During 1960-1961 it was possible for all Polish organ-  
izations to send their members for visits to Moscow or other important  
cities in the Soviet Union. Among the travelers were not only Party ac-  
tivists but also newly-trained technicians, who were assuming positions  
of importance in Polish industry. Despite the fact that most of the students  
and members of the new technically trained class once belonged to the most  
violently anti-Soviet elements in Poland, many returned from their visit  
to the USSR firmly convinced that the Soviet Union would ultimately triumph  
over the West. The visits were usually made aboard regularly organized  
friendship trains, which transported 1500 to 2000 Poles to the Soviet Union  
for a period of two weeks. Many Soviet resorts have also been opened to  
Polish intellectuals in the Crimea and along the Black Sea coast. The re-  
laxation of travel restrictions for visits by Poles to the Soviet Union is  
not limited to trips in one direction.
7. [redacted] the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU) has 50X1-HUM  
also changed in its attitude toward the PZPR. Before 1955 meetings between  
Soviet party groups and their counterparts in the PZPR always stressed the  
primacy of the CPSU. Today a feeling of equality prevails and there is  
more of an air of international friendship between the activists attending  
the meetings.
8. [redacted] 50X1-HUM  
[redacted]  
[redacted] It was customary for certain Politburo members  
to speak to the regional delegates during intermissions. Among the members  
who participated in discussions were Wladyslaw Gomulka, Aleksander Zawadzki,  
Jozef Cyrankiewicz, General Marian Spychalski, Zenon Kliszko, Ignacy Loga-  
Sowski, Edward Ochab and Adam Rapacki. Gomulka and Ochab personally  
talked to members of the Katowice PZPR KW delegation attending the meeting.
9. During such a get-together a member of the Katowice delegation for the first  
time informally mentioned the possibility of Poland's accepting a loan  
from the United States if it were offered. Gomulka answered in approximately  
the following words: "If it becomes evident that the American loan is  
tied to any political conditions or if its acceptance by Poland were to worsen  
our relations with our socialist partners, then we would refuse to accept  
such a loan. In my opinion we should do all we can within our own country

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and within the framework of our own socialist family, so that even if we do accept such a loan it can be limited to a minimum amount. I do not advocate the acceptance of Western alms." Another PZPR delegate then asked, "Couldn't we handle the situation differently? We could accept the highest amount offered by the Americans and then terminate all our other commercial contracts with the Soviets and start building socialism along the Yugoslav pattern." Obviously irritated by the proposal, Gomulka answered sharply, "Here we have another 'improver.' To hell with such theories within Party ranks. For us there is only one ally with whom we are irrevocably tied in all matters, that is, the Soviet Union and the People's Democratic Republics. He who does not want to accept this fact cannot be a member of our Party because he will break up its unity." Nothing further about the subject was said during subsequent informal meetings.

10. [redacted] any true evaluation of the increased individual political liberties in Poland after the October 1956 political upheaval would indicate that improvement was only temporary. In many cases what seemed to be a gain in individual liberties only appeared to be so because Gomulka's true objectives, when he started Poland on what he called "Poland's road to socialism," were not always understood even by high-level PZPR or government officials. Because of this misunderstanding there was a serious disruption of PZPR activity, since many Party officials neglected to carry out projects at all levels of PZPR organizational activity and among the mass of PZPR members. [redacted] at the time he assumed Party leadership, Gomulka himself was not familiar with either internal Polish problems or the role Poland played in the inner circle of international Communism. 50X1-HUM
11. This was demonstrated just after he became first Party secretary by his contradictory views regarding important events. In October 1956 on three occasions in three days he changed his evaluation of the Hungarian revolution. In his statements covering the international political scene in Poland before the elections to Parliament, Gomulka as well as many of his fellow Politburo and Central Committee members declared that the old PZPR pressure methods used in the past to influence the electorate were now at an end and that, instead, free elections would be held with full adherence to democratic principles. But exactly one week before the elections, he reverted to the old PZPR methods when he personally started the election campaign in which the voters were requested not to use booths when marking their ballots, and to accept the full list of government candidates without crossing out any names. Immediately after his speech all booths, except one, were removed from each of the polling places. The one remaining booth was usually so situated that it could not be readily seen, or, if it were in evidence, was in a hard-to-reach place and was watched by two "specialists," who jotted down the names of all persons daring to use it. With those first evidences of Gomulka's duplicity, the mass of non-Party Poles began to wonder whether they could trust the promises of the new PZPR secretary. Similar doubts also began to lurk in the minds of numerous Party activists. 50X1-HUM
12. Soon after becoming secretary, Gomulka came out in favor of the dissolution of the Association of Polish Youth. He recommended the creation of a new, larger association which would embrace all Polish youth organizations with various ideological points of view. Only a few months later, early in 1957, when answering questions raised by PZPR activists at a meeting in Katowice, Gomulka announced that "among the most harmful developments resulting from the October 1956 political upheaval in Poland was the dissolution of the ZMP youth organization." He asked all Katowice PZPR activists "to undertake immediately the task of liquidating the groups of opportunistic youths whose heads have been turned," so that the Party could again concentrate all its efforts on the creation of a single youth organization which would follow the principles of the former ZMP. Gomulka's wishes were fulfilled when the Association of Socialist Youth (Zwiazek Socjalistycznej Mlodziezy)(ZMSO) was organized.

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13. There were other developments which contributed materially to relaxation of PZPR restrictions placed upon the Polish masses--the Poznan riots in June and the Hungarian revolution in October 1956. It was during the period of relaxation that the Poles were able to listen to foreign radio broadcasts from the West and for the first time hear explanations of the previously misunderstood developments inside Poland. Such reports contributed to the restlessness and discontent in all ranks of PZPR officials. Also the reorganizations within the Security Police, Main Information Administration (Główny Zarząd Informacji)(GZI) and other related departments of the Polish government occurring up to the end of 1957 required those institutions to concentrate most of their energies on internal organizational matters; consequently they had little time to devote to the tightening of controls over the Polish public.
14. [redacted] this brought about a temporary relaxation of controls and practically forced the high-level PZPR officials into extending certain privileges to the Polish masses. However, this period of relaxed controls lasted but a short time. In fall 1957 Gomulka specifically asked many of the ousted Stalinists to return to their jobs and to resume their former tried and tested methods of Party activity. At the same time he requested all members of the Central Committee to undertake personal visits to the Municipal and County PZPR Committees in order to encourage Stalinists there to return to active Party work. The task of Central Committee officials who participated in the special discussions with executive (egzekutywa) members attached to municipal and county PZPR units was to explain Gomulka's attitude toward the dismissed Party colleagues. [redacted] 50X1-HUM
- [redacted] the Central Committee members in speaking to executives stressed that the Stalinists who were removed "were wronged, that reactionary elements have accidentally succeeded in making martyrs out of them because the reactionaries took advantage of the temporary let-up in Party revolutionary vigilance." They alleged that in this way the reactionaries caused the worthy and deserving PZPR activists much irreparable harm. 50X1-HUM
15. The result of the intensive Central Committee action for the return of Stalinists which began in 1957 became evident to all the Poles. With each passing month PZPR influence began to return to its former strength. The new methods of PZPR activity were being employed successfully, but many of the old tested techniques were also not discarded. The same Gomulka who in 1956 declared that the "Poznan riots should not be regarded as the outbursts of Polish workers against the authorities of the People's Government, but rather as the reaction of wronged people against false bureaucratic bunglers," now demanded early in 1958 that the 6000 persons who took part in the two-day strike at the Modrzejow mine in Silesia be most seriously punished. In looking back on the post-1956 development of Poland [redacted] 50X1-HUM
- there can be no doubt that, with the exception of the peasants, only an insignificant percentage of Poles may be said to have improved their living conditions during the past five years. [redacted] by December 1960 the Communist Party had completely regained the losses it suffered as a result of the 1956 political unrest so that now it is again capable of devoting all its energies toward the implementation of its pre-1956 goals. 50X1-HUM

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